Grow Rich while you sleep: Selection in Experiments with Voluntary Participation by Gautier, Pieter & Klaauw, Bas van der
TI 2006-088/3 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 
 
Grow rich while you sleep 
 Pieter Gautier 
Bas van der Klaauw 
 
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, and Tinbergen Institute. 
 
  
Tinbergen Institute 
The Tinbergen Institute is the institute for 
economic research of the Erasmus Universiteit 
Rotterdam, Universiteit van Amsterdam, and Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam. 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Roetersstraat 31 
1018 WB Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 551 3500 
Fax: +31(0)20 551 3555 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900 
Fax: +31(0)10 408 9031 
 
 
 
Most TI discussion papers can be downloaded at 
http://www.tinbergen.nl. 
 
Grow Rich while you Sleep:
Selection in experiments with voluntary
participation∗
Pieter A. Gautier†
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute
Bas van der Klaauw‡
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute
October 2006
Abstract
We use data from a promotion campaign of NH-Hoteles to study self-selection of par-
ticipants in a gift-exchange experiment. The promotion campaign allowed guests to
pay any non negative amount of money for a stay in one of 36 hotels in Belgium and the
Netherlands. The data allow us to distinguish between ‘regular guests’, who booked
prior to the announcement of the promotion campaign and guests who booked after
the campaign was announced. During the promotion campaign we varied the posted
price of a room that was communicated to the guests. Only the regular guests respond
to the exogenous variation in the posted price and they pay substantially more on
average. This different behavior cannot be explained by differences in satisfaction or
observed compositional differences between both groups. We argue that the promotion
campaign mainly attracted individuals who find it relatively unimportant to be viewed
of as prosocial.
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1 Introduction
In the weekend of December 16-18, 2005, NH-Hoteles had a promotion activity in all their
36 hotels in Belgium and the Netherlands. When checking out, the hotel guests could decide
themselves how much they wanted to pay for their stay (including the breakfast). Paying
nothing was also allowed. Before the hotel guests actually made their payment, they had to
fill in a short questionnaire about their stay. On this questionnaire, the ”usual” price for a
stay in the hotel was announced. On our request, NH-Hoteles raised this posted price with
20 euros on the first day of the promotion weekend. We exploit this exogenous variation
to investigate the causal effect of the posted price on the paid price and the satisfaction of
guests.
The promotion activity was announced 4 weeks before the weekend in which it took place.
About 6% of the hotel guests in our data set had already booked prior to the announcement
of the promotion activity. These hotel guests could also decide their own price. Since the
promotion activity took place in a weekend, the vast majority of visitors were non-business
people. The main goal of this paper is to compare the behavior of these ”regular guests”
who participated involuntary with the behavior of individuals who participated voluntary
because they booked a hotel after the promotion activity was announced. This allows us to
investigate the consequences of self-selection in (field) experiments. Recently (laboratory)
experiments have been criticized for their lack of external validity by Harrison and List
(2004) and List and Levitt (2005) amongst others and they mention self-selection as one of
the main problems.
The setup of the promotion activity has strong similarities with gift-exchange and tipping
games and to a lesser extent with dictator and trust games.1 These type of games are often
evaluated in the laboratory. To our knowledge there exists no laboratory experiments on
prosocial behavior for such a large group where the stakes are so high. There is some evidence
that agents tend to behave more selfish in the field than in laboratory environments.2 We
find however that even in this non-laboratory setting the guests donate substantial amounts.
Gneezy and List (2006) also study a gift-exchange experiment in the field. They mainly focus
on the representativeness of the environment and argue that great care should be taken when
making inference from laboratory experiments to the field. Our concerns on the external
validity of experiments are based on the composition of the participants rather than the
institutional environment.
1There is a huge literature on dictator games, see Camerer (2003) for an overview. Fehr, Kirchsteiger
and Riedl (1998) is an example of a gift exchange experiment while Ruﬄe (1996) and Azar (2002) discuss
tipping games.
2See List and Levitt (2005). On the other hand, Falk (2004) gives field evidence that donators to a charity
fund pay more if they receive a small gift (i.e. a postcard).
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Laboratory experiments usually have voluntary participation and therefore are likely to
attract a selective group of individuals. Participants are often students, but selection into
laboratory experiments can also be on unobserved characteristics. For example, altruistic
individuals may be less likely to participate in experiments, where participants can signal
prosocial behavior at a cost, than egoistic individuals.3 For experiments that aim to mimic
real-world markets, it is desirable that the participants are representative for the market
participants. For example, in complicated auctions the market participants are typically
experts in the field while participants in laboratory experiments are not. So the problem is
not selectivity perse´ but the fact that participants in a laboratory experiment may behave
fundamentally different than the relevant group they are supposed to represent. Also in
many field experiments participation is voluntary, so the selection problems we highlight in
this paper may be relevant for field experiments.
To illustrate the selectivity problem in gift-exchange experiments consider the following
example. Suppose workers vary in the way they value money and the desire to be viewed of as
a prosocial individual, see Be´nabou and Tirole (2006), and that they can take two routes from
the railway station to their office: a long route with few beggars and a short route with many
beggars. A researcher who is interested in how much people are in general willing to donate
to beggars underestimates the donations if he looks at the average donation that a beggar
receives. The reason for this is that in the researchers sample the most selfish workers, who
choose the short route with the beggars, are overrepresented. The more altruistic workers
will, when being face-to-face with a beggar, donate a large sum of money to meet the high
social standards imposed on themselves. They are also most likely to take the long route to
avoid being forced to make costly signals when meeting a beggar. In order to identify the
average willingness to donate for the entire population one would need workers who are not
aware of the location of beggars. The regular guests in our experiment play exactly this role.
The main contribution of this paper is that we present evidence that some concerns on
self-selection are legitimated. Compared to laboratory experiments our data are relatively
rich on explanatory variables, but controlling for these observables does not solve the problem
of self-selection. Furthermore, we relate the size of the donations and, more importantly, the
response to variations in the posted price to these observables and continue to find different
behavior between the regular and the experiment guests.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the design of the experiment. In
section 3 we present our main results, section 4 discusses some implications of our results
and provides a theoretical background. Finally, section 5 concludes.
3Lazear, Malmendier and Weber (2005) give evidence that some participants in their experiment were
willing to pay money in order to avoid playing a dictator game.
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2 Design of the field experiment
During the weekend of the promotion activity, NH-Hoteles allowed guests to book a hotel for
at most one night. At check-out each hotel guest had to hand in a short questionnaire which
they received while checking in. The appendix contains a copy of the questionnaire. This
questionnaire stated a usual price for a stay in the hotel, which we refer to as the posted
price. This posted price depends on the type of hotel. When actually checking out, the
hotel guests handed the completed questionnaire together with their voluntary payment to
the receptionist of the hotel, who wrote the amount of the payment on the questionnaire.
The questionnaire explicitly stated that the receptionist would ask for a reason if a guest
would make a payment of 0 euros.4 It is very likely that this increases donations since there
exists a lot of evidence that people increase their level of cooperation when they are being
watched, e.g. Milinsky, Semman and Krambeck (2002) and Soetevent (2005).
All 36 hotels of NH-Hoteles in Belgium and The Netherlands participated in the promo-
tion activity. The promotion activity was announced in an advertisement campaign using
billboards, advertisements in newspapers and magazines, mailings and internet, four weeks
prior to the weekend of the promotion activity. The guests who booked via an external travel
agent were not allowed to participate. The questionnaire contained a question about how
the guests had learned about the promotion activity. A small fraction of the guests were not
aware of the promotion activity until the moment they checked in. Most of these individuals
had booked already before the start of the promotion campaign. They could also decide
how much they wanted to pay for their stay. We call these individuals regular guests and
refer to the other guests as experiment guests. The regular guests can be considered to be
involuntary participants in a gift-exchange-field experiment while the experiment guests are
voluntary participants.
In addition, the questionnaire contained three blocks of questions. The first set of ques-
tions involved the gender, age, place of residence and nationality of the guest. The second
block contained questions on how often the individual usually stays in hotels and how fa-
miliar the guest is with HN-Hoteles. The third block of questions was about the satisfaction
with the stay. The guests had to give an over-all grade for the stay and they had to give
separate opinions on the quality of the personnel, room and breakfast. Just before this third
block of questions concerning the guest’s satisfaction, the questionnaire posted the usual
price for the stay. On our request this posted price was increased with 20 euros for the first
night of the promotion activity.5
4About paying nothing the following text was written on the questionnaire: ”What happens if I don’t
want to pay anything? That’s possible, which would mean that you did not like it at all. We will, of course,
ask you why you experienced a stay in our hotel worthless”.
5Two hotels distributed the questionnaires with the increased prices on Saturday and Sunday (and the
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In total 5885 guests completed the questionnaires. The non-response rate was less than
1 percent. We deleted 237 questionnaires from our data because either the amount paid or
the over-all hotel grade was missing. Furthermore, we excluded 234 questionnaires for which
gender or age was missing or the age of the individual was below 16 years old. Finally, we
dropped 392 individuals from the data for which we do not know whether they were regular
guests or experiment guests. This leaves us with 5022 observations: 301 regular guests and
4721 experiment guests.
Table 1 provides some summary statistics of the data. We observe that regular guests
pay on average about twice as much as the experiment guests. This difference cannot be
explained by the fact that regular guests stay in different hotels than the experiment guests.
The distribution of regular guests and experiment guests over three, four and five-star hotels
is roughly the same. Both the fraction of individuals that does not pay anything and that
pays less than 10 percent of the usual price is about twice as large among experiment guests
as among regular guests. Furthermore, while only 1 percent of the experiment guests pays
more than 90 percent of the usual price, about 12 percent of the regular guests pays more
than 90 percent of the regular price. The difference in donations is also not due to the fact
that the group of regular guests contains more business people who do not pay themselves.
Recall that the experiment was held in a weekend with few business travelers. We also have
information on whether the guests often stayed in hotels, which is strongly correlated with
being a business traveler. Below, we show that controlling for this, the difference remains
large. Furthermore, we checked whether the regular guests paid themselves or whether
someone else paid for them. We could do this because the hotel records unique custom
numbers of their visitors and links this information with, amongst others, who pays the
bill.6 Within the group of regular guests we have this information for 194 of the customers
(64%). We find that within the group of regular guests, 93% paid themselves. Those who
did not pay themselves paid on average 6 euro less than those who paid themselves but the
difference is not significant.
Figure 1 shows kernel estimates for the density function of donations of the experiment
guests and the regular guests. Donations are taken as fraction of the posted price on the
questionnaires on Saturday and Sunday. Some values are above 1 because some people paid
more than this usual price. Most of this occurred on Friday when the posted price was 20
euros above the one on Saturday and Sunday. From the figure it is clear that there is a lot
of variation in donations and that regular guests pay more than the experiment guests over
the entire distribution.
lower prices on Friday). In one hotel both types of forms were distributed on each day.
6The checking of who made the payment had to be done case by case by an employee from NH-Hoteles,
therefore this was only done for the group of regular guests.
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These differences cannot be explained by differences in satisfaction about the hotel. The
average grade is about 7.3 for both the regular guests and the experiment guests. In Figure 2
we have plotted kernel estimates of the grades.7 The density functions of the regular guests
and the experiment guests are rather similar. Table 1 shows that there are considerable
compositional differences between the two groups. Among the experiment guests the fraction
of females is higher.8 Furthermore, experiment guests are on average younger and have
more often the Dutch nationality. The group of regular guests contains a larger share of
individuals who stay often (at least 5 nights per year) in hotels. Finally, the questionnaire
provided some room for comments. Both within the group of regular guests and within the
group of experiment guests, about 47% wrote at least three lines of comments.
3 Results
3.1 Donations
Our main variable of interest is the donation paid by the guests. We already established
that the regular guests pay approximately 24 euro more than the experiment guests. How-
ever, there are large compositional differences between both groups. In Table 2 we present
results from a regression that accounts for observed compositional differences (and for hotel
fixed effects). The estimation results show that regular guests pay about 18 euros more
than experiment guests with similar observed characteristics and this difference is highly
significant. This implies that observed compositional differences can only explain 25 percent
of the differences in donations between regular guests and experiment guests. The posted
price does not affect donations significantly. In fact, raising the posted price by 20 euros
on average only increases a donation by about 0.7 euro. Donations increase with age (until
age 81). Guests with the Belgian or Dutch nationality pay significantly less than individuals
with other nationalities (also the difference between Dutch and Belgians is significant) and
women pay less than men. Surprisingly, whether or not people stay often in hotels does not
affect donations.
Obviously, there are unobserved characteristics that cause regular guests to pay more than
the experiment guests. But we cannot conclude that the experiment guests behave differently
from the regular guests. The regular guests made their hotel reservation expecting to pay
the usual price, while the experiment guests booked after they learned about the promotion
campaign. The marginal willingness to pay of the regular guests is therefore above the usual
7The humps are caused by the fact that people typically give whole-number grades.
8The questionnaire did not ask if an individual stayed alone in a room or as part of a couple. According
to the hotel managers the vast majority were couples. We assume that the person who completed the
questionnaire was also the decision maker on the payment.
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price of the hotel they are staying in.
Our findings are also in line with Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Ko˝szegi and Ra-
bin (2006). The latter developed a model with reference dependent preferences where the
reference point of an agent is determined by rational expectations and willingness to pay
(conditional on purchase) is increasing in expected prices. Furthermore, when making the
hotel reservation, some experiment guests did not end up at their first choice because the
top hotels were booked full fast. The regular guests could therefore derive a higher utility
from staying in the same hotel than the experiment guests. Hence, at this stage we cannot
rule out that both regular guests and experiment guests pay a particular fraction of their
marginal willingness to pay and then it is not surprising that regular guests pay significantly
more.
In Tables 3 and 4 we present the results from separate regressions for the regular guests
and the experiment guests. We are mainly interested in the effect of the posted price on the
donations made by both types of guests. The first column of the tables shows that regular
guests pay significantly more in response to the posted price increase while the experiment
guests do not respond to exogenous changes in the posted price. The second column shows
that this result remains present after controlling for individual characteristics. A 20 euro
increase in the posted price causes the regular guests to increase their payment by about
11.32 euro, which is about 23% of their average payment. The experiment guests only pay
0.08 euro extra if the posted price is increased by 20 euro. This implies that regular guests not
only pay more, but also that they respond differently to changes in the institutional setting
than the experiment guests. In Section 4 we return to the implications of this finding.
3.2 Satisfaction
Recall from the previous section that regular guests and experiment guests gave on average
approximately the same grade for their stay. However, if we account for differences in ob-
served individual characteristics and hotel fixed effects, then regular guests give significantly
higher grades (see Table 5). Either they are more satisfied or they respond to the gift of
a free room by giving a higher grade as a form of positive reciprocity. If the difference in
payments between regular and experiment guests would entirely be driven by satisfaction,
then the returns to an additional point (on a ten-point scale) in grades should be around
118 euro. This huge return makes it implausible that differences in satisfaction are the only
reason for differences in donations. The posted price has a small negative effect on satisfac-
tion; a 20 euro increase in the posted price reduces the hotel grade by less than 1% of the
average grade. Females give higher grades than males (recall that males paid significantly
more). The average satisfaction is increasing in age for individuals older than 21 years.
Belgians (and also Dutch) are significantly more satisfied than foreigners. This is surprising
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since Belgians and Dutch pay significantly less than foreigners. The difference in satisfaction
between Belgians and Dutch is not significant. Individuals who stay in hotels often, give
significantly lower grades.
Again we have performed separate regressions for the regular guests and for the experi-
ment guests. The results of these regressions are presented in Tables 6 and 7. From the first
column of the tables we see that the posted price has a small negative effect on the satisfac-
tion of both the experiment guests and regular guests. Only for the experiment guests this
effect is significant (at the 10%-level). Once we control for observed individual character-
istics (see the second column), the posted price no longer significantly affects satisfaction.
In both groups females give higher grades than males, older individuals give higher grades
(the maximum for regular guests is 66 years and the minimum for experiment guests is 24).
Being Dutch has opposite effects in both groups and those who stay often in hotels give
lower grades.
The regressions above show that regular guests pay much more, but are only slightly
more satisfied with their stay than experiment guests. Furthermore, a higher posted price
increases the donations of regular guests, but this cannot be caused by an increased satis-
faction as the posted price does not affect satisfaction. This raises the question if a higher
level of satisfaction is associated with higher donations. The third columns of Tables 3 and 4
show that indeed more satisfied guests donate more. Regular guests who are one point more
satisfied pay on average 4.7 euro extra, which is 9.6% of the average donation. The returns
to an additional point in satisfaction is lower for the experiment guests both in absolute and
relative terms. Experiment guests who are one point more satisfied pay on average 1.7 euro
extra, which is 6.8% of their average donation. It should be stressed that these results should
not be interpreted as causal as the donation and level of satisfaction are jointly determined
by the hotel guests. Therefore, these regressions suffer from endogeneity problems. For the
regular guests the effect of the posted price on donations remains unaffected after including
the level of satisfaction as additional regressor. This suggests again that the effect of the
posted price on donations cannot be explained by an increased level of satisfaction. Conse-
quently, the difference in payment strategies between the regular guests and the experiment
guests cannot be attributed to differences in levels of satisfaction.
To further investigate the relation between payment behavior and satisfaction, we explore
data on how guests experience different aspects of the hotel. The questionnaire asked the
hotel guests to rate the personnel, room and breakfast separately. The rating occurred in 4
categories (i) bad, (ii) insufficient, (iii) good, or (iv) very good. Only very few hotel guests
state that something is bad and therefore we combine this category with the insufficient
category. We have constructed dummy variables that indicate if a guest valuates some
aspect as either good or very good. Only 5% of the hotel guests finds the personnel bad or
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insufficient and this fraction is 17% for the room and 7% for the breakfast. The fraction of
hotel guests that considers the personnel good is 72% while it is 68% for the room and 64%
for the breakfast. 23% of the participants rates the personnel very good, for the room and
the breakfast those fractions are 15% and 29% respectively.
The third columns of Tables 6 and 7 show how the hotel grade depends on how the guests
evaluate the personnel, room and breakfast. Both for the experiment guests and the regular
guests the evaluation of the room has the largest impact on the overall satisfaction and the
breakfast has the smallest impact. For the regular guests the personnel is considered to be
almost as important as the room, while for the experiment guests the evaluation of the room
is significantly more important.
In the fourth columns of Tables 3 and 4 we have replaced the overall hotel grade with the
evaluations of the personnel, room and breakfast in the donations regressions. For the regular
guests, the small sample makes the standard errors large. Even though the coefficients are
not significant, there is some indication that regular guests who valuate the room as good
or very good give higher donations, while this is less the case for breakfast and not at all
for the personnel. For the experiment guests an increase in the valuation of any of the three
components from bad or insufficient to good or very good raises the donation. However, the
magnitude at which donations increase does not vary much between personnel, room and
breakfast.
3.3 Comments about the stay
The questionnaire offered some room for making comments. As mentioned in the previous
section both in the group of regular guests and experiment guests, slightly less than 50%
used this space to add at least 3 lines of substantial comments. Adding comments could
be a justification for paying a lower donation or even a substitute for a monetary payment.
In the latter case the guest provides information instead of money. On the other hand,
hotel guests who make a large donation possibly perceive that this gives them the right
to comment on the hotel. In the first columns of Tables 8 and 9 we regress whether or
not a guest made comments on the individual characteristics and the hotel fixed effects.
For regular guests none of the individual characteristics has a significant impact. For the
experiment guest we find that individuals around age 45, women, persons with a Dutch
nationality, and individuals who often stay in hotels are most likely to write comments. In
the second column of the tables we have added the hotel grade as additional variable. This
shows that both regular guests and experiment guests are more likely to comment if they
are less satisfied. The third and fourth columns show that the size of the donation does not
affect the likelihood of commenting. The main conclusion is thus that hotel guests mainly
use the space on the questionnaire to express a negative opinion about the hotel and that
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the size of the donation is unrelated to making comments. The first coincides with the fact
that most comments indeed involved possible improvements to the hotel.
4 Explanations and implications of our results
A straightforward explanation for the difference in donations between the regular and ex-
periment guests would be that the regular guests are involved in a repeated game, while the
experiment guests play a one-shot game. In that case the donations of the regular guests
could be interpreted as investments in a good relation with (the personnel of) NH-hoteles.
Recall that the questionnaire asked whether or not the hotel guests stayed in an NH hotel
before. About 47% of the regular guests and 33% of the experiment guests stayed in an NH
hotel before. For both the regular guests and the experiment guests, those who stayed in an
NH hotel before donate on average about 5% more. We have repeated the earlier analyses
on the donations for guests who never stayed in a NH hotel before. Most likely these are all
hotel guests playing one-shot games. For the experiment guests a 20 euro higher posted price
decreases average donations with 0.44 euro, while for the regular guests it increases average
donations with 4.96 euro. The latter estimate is significant at a 10% level. Furthermore, the
experiment guests, who stayed in NH hotels before, only increase their donation on average
by 1.10 euro in response to a 20 euro higher posted price and this estimate is insignificant.
So even if we stratify our groups of hotel guests further by experience with NH hotels, we
find the same results as before. This implies that the idea that regular guests play repeated
games and experiment guests play a one-shot game cannot explain the behavioral differences
between both groups.
The fact that many individuals pay substantial amounts of money to the hotels is in
line with the enormous amount of evidence from dictator, gift-exchange, public-good, and
trust games in the laboratory. Those results suggest that individuals do not only care about
monetary rewards because if they would, they would pay nothing in the final stage of the
game. Our paper contributes to this literature by extending it to a non-undergraduate
student population in a real world setting. Moreover, our large sample size allowed us to
show how donations vary by gender, nationality and age. We find that people are very
heterogeneous in terms of their donations. The evidence that many people care about more
than their own monetary pay-offs resulted in a booming behavioral literature and many
concepts from psychology were introduced in economics, like fairness, reciprocity, social
norms and trust. Camerer, Loewenstein and Rabin (2003) provide a selection of the most
important contributions in this field. More recently, there is a growing literature that explains
the experimental findings without abandoning the standard neo-classical methodology which
is based on consistent preferences and equilibrium, see for a recent contribution Be´nabou
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and Tirole (2006). Such an approach has the advantage that theory is not replaced by a
collection of anecdotes that only holds in a very specific context.
The substantial donations can also be explained by a standard reputation model where
the hotel guests signal that they are wealthy or generous to either the personnel, the persons
they shared a room with or themselves. As mentioned before, there is experimental evidence
that cooperation increases if agents know or perceive that they are being observed. Soetevent
(2005) shows that in church people donate more in an open basket than in a closed basket.
Bateson, Nettle and Roberts (2006) show that even photocopied images of a pair of eyes
increase contributions to an honesty box used to collect coffee money in a university coffee
room. Compared to having an image of flowers, people paid on average 2.76 times as much
when the image contained the photocopied eyes. In our experiment the hotel guests paid
non-anonymously to the personnel, which explains the high average donations. If even very
weak subconscious cues like photocopied eyes make people act more altruistic, it is likely
that in many anonymous experiments there might have been small cues that gave people the
perception that they were being observed. If this is correct, the experimental evidence on
reciprocity can also be explained by standard reputation concerns. Given that most hotel
guests have a desire to donate money after a stay in a good hotel, it is not puzzling why
a profit maximizing hotel chain chooses a promotion campaign like this. The management
of NH-Hoteles informed us that total profits in this weekend were higher than profits in the
same weekend a year earlier. This is because there is usually excess capacity in the week
before Christmas while during the promotion activity most hotels were fully booked and the
marginal costs of a booked room are low.
The regular guests booked the hotel before the promotion activity was announced and
therefore their marginal willingness to pay exceeds the usual price. If hotel guests pay a
fraction of their marginal willingness to pay, this explains the difference in average donations
between regular guests and experiment guests. It can, however, not explain why only the
regular guests respond to exogenous variation in the posted price. Explaining the latter
finding requires that prices only affect the marginal willingness to pay of the regular guests.
There exists an older literature that allows prices to enter directly into the utility function
(see Kalman, 1968). This applies in particular to goods with a snob appeal but it could also
reflect that consumers judge quality by price. An alternative reason why prices affect utility
is that prices influence an individual’s reference point (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1974;
Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2006). Using non-experimental data on equilibrium prices and quantities,
it is impossible to identify supply and demand from each other and thus to investigate if
prices directly affect utility. Ariely, Ko¨szegi, Mazar, Shampan’er (2004) report evidence
based on experimental data that reservation prices depend on the distribution of prices. The
exogenous price variation used in this paper had a negligible effect on the valuation of both
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experiment and regular guests. At the same time it has a big impact on the amount of money
that the regular guests pay while it has a negligible and insignificant effect on the amount
that the experiment guests pay. Explaining the latter finding with reference point utility
requires that the posted prices are outside the range of possible donations for the experiment
guests while prices are in the increasing part of the utility function for the regular guests.
The larger donations and the response to the exogenous price variation of the involuntary
participating regular guests are also in line with the sorting argument of List and Levitt
(2005) and Be´nabou and Tirole (2006). The latter paper studies the interaction between
social motives, material incentives and the economic environment. People can engage in
costly prosocial behavior to signal their type to others or to themselves. Individuals who
think of themselves or want to be thought of as very generous and prosocial are less likely
to voluntary participate in the gift-exchange field experiment because it requires a relatively
large sum of money to confirm those expectations.9 The main implication of our results
is therefore that we have to be careful in extrapolating conclusions that are based on an
experimental setting with voluntary participation without correcting for self selection.
5 Final remarks
We studied a field experiment of a gift-exchange game where the gift is a stay in a 3-5 star
hotel in the Netherlands or Belgium. The data allowed us to distinguish between voluntary
and involuntary participants. We find that only the involuntary participants respond to an
exogenous increase in the posted price of the gift by paying more for their stay. We explain
these behavioral differences from differences in the degree that individuals are prosocial. Indi-
viduals who consider themselves as highly prosocial should give higher donations to conform
and signal their type to others and themselves. Therefore, highly prosocial individuals gain
less from the gift-exchange game than individuals who put more weight on direct material
gains. Consequently, the fraction of highly prosocial individuals will be substantially smaller
in the group of voluntary participants than in the group of involuntary participants. Labo-
ratory or field experiments with voluntary participation that aim to test prosocial behavior
are therefore likely to underestimate prosocial behavior. In market environments agents can
often avoid situations where they must make costly contributions to signal their generosity.
This explains why prosocial behavior is observed less frequently in market environments. At
a more general level our message is that both in laboratory and field experiments we should
worry as much about problems related to self-selection of participants as in non-experimental
9There exist some anecdotical evidence for this. The marketing department of NH-hoteles received an
email of someone who liked the promotion but wrote that he would feel very uncomfortable to pay less than
50 euro for a stay and therefore decided not to participate.
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studies.
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Regular guests Experiment guests
Observations 301 4721
Donations (euro) 48.75 24.41
Paid nothing 8.0% 14.4%
Paid less than 10% 13.0% 27.0%
Paid more than 90% 12.3% 1.0%
3-star hotel 50.8% 46.0%
4-star hotel 36.9% 35.8%
5-star hotel 12.3% 18.2%
Hotel grade 7.35 7.26
Female 30.6% 44.2%
Age 39.5 33.1
Belgium 9.6% 10.8%
Dutch 58.8% 87.0%
Often in hotels 45.8% 25.4%
Many comments 46.5% 47.8%
Table 1: Summary statistics
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Regular guest 18.088∗∗ (1.302)
Posted price 0.035 (0.032)
Female −1.469∗∗ (0.572)
Age/10 7.566∗∗ (1.341)
Age squared/100 −0.466∗∗ (0.166)
Belgium −8.630∗∗ (1.772)
Dutch −11.184∗∗ (1.559)
Often in hotels 0.218 (0.648)
Fixed hotel effects yes
Sample size 5022
Note: * significant at 10% and ** significant at 5%.
Table 2: Price paid.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Posted price 0.658∗∗ (0.206) 0.566∗∗ (0.204) 0.595∗∗ (0.202) 0.475∗∗ (0.223)
Female 1.767 (4.279) 0.609 (4.237) 1.131 (4.583)
Age/10 13.145∗ (7.876) 9.509 (7.863) 7.768 (9.421)
Age squared/100 −0.877 (0.894) −0.603 (0.886) −0.336 (1.062)
Belgium −9.972 (7.771) −11.285 (7.674) −11.805 (8.570)
Dutch −10.759∗∗ (4.711) −12.421∗∗ (4.679) −11.557∗∗ (5.171)
Often in hotels 0.691 (3.900) 1.761 (3.862) 2.679 (4.366)
Hotel grade 4.687∗∗ (1.602)
Personnel good 1.708 (15.423)
Personnel very good −2.724 (16.213)
Room good 8.297 (6.778)
Room very good 12.389 (8.477)
Breakfast good 6.927 (7.439)
Breakfast very good 6.731 (8.382)
Fixed hotel effects yes yes yes yes
Sample size 301 301 301 263
Note: * significant at 10% and ** significant at 5%.
Table 3: Price paid of regular guests.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Posted price 0.010 (0.033) 0.004 (0.032) 0.009 (0.032) 0.015 (0.034)
Female −1.586∗∗ (0.559) −1.728∗∗ (0.557) −1.992∗∗ (0.582)
Age/10 0.749∗∗ (0.134) 7.829∗∗ (1.337) 7.246∗∗ (1.388)
Age squared/100 −0.481∗∗ (0.167) −0.551∗∗ (0.166) −0.485∗∗ (0.172)
Belgium −6.694∗∗ (2.058) −6.725∗∗ (2.049) −3.827∗ (2.187)
Dutch −9.037∗∗ (1.885) −8.959∗∗ (1.877) −6.287∗∗ (2.028)
Often in hotels 0.091 (0.642) 0.506 (0.643) 0.709 (0.676)
Hotel grade 1.671∗∗ (0.259)
Personnel good 4.163∗∗ (1.481)
Personnel very good 2.099 (1.605)
Room good 3.048∗∗ (0.811)
Room very good 3.718∗∗ (1.119)
Breakfast good 2.421∗∗ (1.216)
Breakfast very good 2.985∗∗ (1.322)
Fixed hotel effects yes yes yes yes
Sample size 4721 4721 4721 4337
Note: * significant at 10% and ** significant at 5%.
Table 4: Price paid of experiment guests.
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Regular guest 0.154∗∗ (0.070)
Posted price −0.003∗ (0.002)
Female 0.090∗∗ (0.031)
Age/10 −0.145∗∗ (0.072)
Age squared/100 0.035∗∗ (0.009)
Belgium 0.218∗∗ (0.096)
Dutch 0.149∗ (0.084)
Often in hotels −0.249∗∗ (0.035)
Fixed hotel effects yes
Sample size 5022
Note: * significant at 10% and ** significant at 5%.
Table 5: Hotel grades.
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(1) (2) (3)
Posted price −0.006 (0.008) −0.006 (0.008) −0.009 (0.006)
Female 0.247 (0.163) 0.138 (0.117)
Age/10 0.776∗∗ (0.300) 0.237 (0.240)
Age squared/100 −0.059∗ (0.034) −0.013 (0.027)
Belgium 0.280 (0.296) −0.155 (0.218)
Dutch 0.355∗ (0.179) 0.224 (0.132)
Often in hotels −0.228 (0.149) −0.075 (0.111)
Personnel good 1.336∗∗ (0.393)
Personnel very good 1.724∗∗ (0.413)
Room good 1.324∗∗ (0.173)
Room very good 2.000∗∗ (0.216)
Breakfast good 0.673∗∗ (0.190)
Breakfast very good 0.982∗∗ (0.214)
Fixed hotel effects yes yes yes
Sample size 301 301 263
Note: * significant at 10% and ** significant at 5%.
Table 6: Hotel grades of regular guests.
(1) (2) (3)
Posted price −0.003∗ (0.002) −0.003 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)
Female 0.085∗∗ (0.031) 0.030 (0.024)
Age/10 −0.204∗∗ (0.075) −0.180∗∗ (0.057)
Age squared/100 0.042∗∗ (0.009) −0.027∗∗ (0.007)
Belgium 0.018 (0.116) 0.068 (0.090)
Dutch −0.047 (0.106) 0.149∗ (0.084)
Often in hotels −0.248∗∗ (0.036) −0.105∗∗ (0.028)
Personnel good 0.813∗∗ (0.061)
Personnel very good 1.138∗∗ (0.066)
Room good 1.058∗∗ (0.033)
Room very good 1.708∗∗ (0.046)
Breakfast good 0.593∗∗ (0.050)
Breakfast very good 0.967∗∗ (0.054)
Fixed hotel effects yes yes yes
Sample size 4721 4721 4337
Note: * significant at 10% and ** significant at 5%.
Table 7: Hotel grades of experiment guests.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Posted price 0.000 (0.003) 0.000 (0.003) 0.000 (0.003) −0.000 (0.003)
Female 0.042 (0.069) 0.061 (0.069) 0.042 (0.069) 0.061 (0.069)
Age/10 −0.129 (0.127) −0.083 (0.126) −0.133 (0.128) −0.091 (0.127)
Age squared/100 0.013 (0.014) 0.010 (0.014) 0.013 (0.014) 0.010 (0.014)
Belgium 0.082 (0.123) 0.102 (0.122) 0.085 (0.124) 0.111 (0.122)
Dutch 0.086 (0.077) 0.110 (0.076) 0.090 (0.078) 0.120 (0.077)
Often in hotels −0.002 (0.063) −0.009 (0.062) −0.003 (0.063) −0.010 (0.062)
Hotel grade −0.078∗∗ (0.027) −0.081∗∗ (0.028)
Donation 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Fixed hotel effects yes yes yes yes
Sample size 288 288 288 288
Note: * significant at 10% and ** significant at 5%.
Table 8: Writing many comments of regular guests.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Posted price −0.000 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001) −0.000 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001)
Female 0.025∗ (0.015) 0.035∗∗ (0.014) 0.025∗ (0.015) 0.036∗∗ (0.014)
Age/10 0.216∗∗ (0.035) 0.196∗∗ (0.034) 0.217∗∗ (0.035) 0.193∗∗ (0.035)
Age squared/100 −0.025∗∗ (0.004) −0.020∗∗ (0.004) −0.025∗∗ (0.004) −0.020∗∗ (0.004)
Belgium 0.077 (0.056) 0.087 (0.055) 0.077 (0.056) 0.089 (0.055)
Dutch 0.105∗∗ (0.052) 0.109∗∗ (0.050) 0.104∗∗ (0.052) 0.112∗∗ (0.051)
Often in hotels 0.054∗∗ (0.017) 0.027 (0.017) 0.054∗∗ (0.017) 0.027 (0.017)
Hotel grade −0.106∗∗ (0.007) −0.107∗∗ (0.007)
Donation −0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Fixed hotel effects yes yes yes yes
Sample size 4550 4550 4550 4550
Note: * significant at 10% and ** significant at 5%.
Table 9: Writing many comments of experiment guests.
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Figure 1: Kernel density estimation of the payments of regular and experiment guests as
fraction of the usual hotel price.
Figure 2: Kernel density estimation of the hotel grades given by regular and experiment
guests.
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Appendix: Questionnaire filled in at check-out.
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